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INTRODUCTION

"[The idea that the] U.N. needs business and business needs the
U.N .... is as relevant today as it was six years ago." 1

The United Nations (U.N.)2 and corporations3 are two major global
actors which for some time now have been facing a crisis - a crisis
about their place, role, relevance, goodwill, and legitimacy in an everchanging world order. The crisis is triggered, among other events, by
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1. Secretary Kofi Annan speaking at the inaugural meeting of the Global Compact
Board on June 28, 2006. Global Compact Office, Final Report: Inaugural Meeting of the
Global
Compact
Board
4
(2006),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/final_rep_board030806.pdf
[hereinafter COMPACT BOARD MEETING REPORT].
2. Secretary Kofi Annan, in a recent report, acknowledged that the "[e]vents in recent
years have also led to declining public confidence in the United Nations itself." The
Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights
for All, ~ 10, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc N59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005),
available
at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/U.N.DOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElemen
t [hereinafter In Larger Freedom]. The most recent example is the U.N.'s inability to act
faster to end hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. The Secretary General reported
having said that "the widely perceived delay in drafting a resolution had 'badly shaken'
global faith in the U.N .. " U.N. Vote Backs Lebanon Ceasefire, BBC NEWS, Aug. 12, 2006,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4785001.stm. See also ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 336-37 (2d ed. 2005). On reforming the U.N., see In Larger
Freedom, supra note 2, 39-52; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Note and Comment, Security,
Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of U.N. Reform, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 619
(2005); Yehuda Z. Blum, Note and Comment, Proposals for U.N. Security Council Reform,
99 AM. J. INT'L L. 632 (2005); Thomas M. Franck, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq
Conflict: What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (2003).
3. The corporate crisis is caused, among others, by what I call "two interrelated sets of
corporate failures." The failure of BCCI, Enron, Worldcom, HIH, One Tel, Ansett, etc.,
represents the first set of corporate failures, that is, the failure to respect duties primarily
towards shareholders. The second set of corporate failures, on the other hand, signifies the
failure of corporations to take into the interest of stakeholders and community, namely,
human rights, labor rights, and the environment.
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the end of the Cold War, 4 rise of the U.S. empire, 5 constant conflicts,
the spread of free market ideology, globalization, 6 and a consequent
reorientation in the role of states. 7 This article, however, is not an
exploration of the crisis outlined above, or even of the triggering events.
Rather it seeks to critique the U.N. Global Compact, a "public-private"
partnership 8 initiated primarily by two tormented, but indispensable,
global institutions: the U.N. and corporations. 9
Through this partnership the U.N. hoped to expand its reach from

4. Friedman writes: "The Cold War had been a struggle between two economic systems
- capitalism and communism - and with the fall of the [Berlin] wall, there was only one
system left .... " THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
GLOBALIZED WORLD IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 49 (2005).
5. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL: AMERICA'S QUEST FOR
GLOBAL DOMINANCE (2003); AMERICA UNRIV ALEO: THE FUTURE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER
(G. John Ikenberry ed., 2002); ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY (2002); Chandra Muzaffar, A Global Empire Is In
the Making: The First Global Empire in History (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/analysis/2005/1230militarypower.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2006).
6. Although a precise definition of "globalization" is not possible, it is about
interdependence, interconnectedness, and the movement of products, services, money,
people, ideas, technology, culture, etc. in a speedy, efficient way and with minimum
restrictions. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 4.
7. Anderson points out "the changing perception of the state from a redistributive
forum to a mechanism for ensuring, through a procedural rule of law, the efficient
functioning of the market economy." Gavin W. Anderson, Social Democracy and the
Limits of Rights Constitutionalism, 17 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 31, 58 (2004); see also Saskia
Sassen, What's Wrong With International Law Scholarship?: The State and Economic
Globalization: Any Implications for International Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 109 (2000)
(arguing that economic globalization, rather than merely resulting in decline of states, is a
transformative process that reconfigures states' power and repositions their work); see
generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on
the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
769 (1998).
8. The U.N. has adopted the following broad, general definition of partnership:
"Partnerships are defined as voluntary and collaborative relationships between various
parties, both State and non-State, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve
a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks and responsibilities,
resources and benefits." The Secretary General, Enhanced Cooperation Between the United
Nations and All Relevant Partners, in Particular the Private Sector, ~ 8, delivered to the
General Assembly,
U.N.Doc.
N60/214
(Aug.
10,
2005),
available
at
http://daccessdd.un.org/doc/U.N.DOC/GEN/N05/457/06/PDF/N0545706.pdf?OpenElement.
The report also classifies partnerships with the U.N. into different categories based on
function/purpose. Id. at~ 11.
9. The Secretary General highlighted why the U.N., despite imperfections, is vital.
Kofi Annan, Our Mission Remains Vital, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/sg-22feb2005.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
Cassese also observes that "over the years the U.N. has proved indispensable." CASSESE,
supra note 2, at 338. Regarding the indispensability of corporations, see infra note 11.
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states to non-state actors and in that process revive and reinvent its
relevance on the global stage. 10 This U.N. partnership with private nonstate actors also became imperative because the U.N. could neither
fulfill its ambitious goals under the U.N. Charter nor could the objective
of ensuring a sustainable and inclusive globalization be achieved solely
with the support of states. 11 At a wider level, the "public-private"
partnership represented a deviation in the generally state-centric nature
of international law: 12 it not only reflected the growing influence of
non-states actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) 13 in
international law making, 14 but might also be interpreted as an
incremental step towards their recognition as subjects of international
law. 15

10. Nolan writes: "Constantly battling its cnhcs, which label it bureaucratic, oldfashioned and ineffective; the U.N. is once again trying to reinvent itself. As part of the
process to streamline and modernize the organization, Secretary-General Kofi Annan is
reaching out, beyond its nation state members, to non-state actors, particularly corporations,
to help address human rights issues." Justine Nolan, The United Nations' Compact with
Business: Hindering or Helping the Protection of Human rights?, 24 U. QUEENSLAND L.J.
445, 445 (2005).

11. Secretary General admits: "States, however, cannot do the job alone. We need an
active civil society and a dynamic private sector." In Larger Freedom, supra note 2, at 6.
"Partnering with business and civil society ... has turned into a necessity for the United
Nations in order to 'get the job done."' JAN MARTIN WITTE & WOLFGANG REINICKE,
BUSINESS UNUSUAL: FACILITATING UNITED NATIONS REFORM THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS ix
(2005),
available
at
http://globalpublicpolicy.net/businessU .N. usual/down/files/Report_in_full. pdf.
See also
Surya Deva, Sustainable Good Governance and Corporations: An Analysis of Asymmetries,
18 GEO.lNT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 707, 712-14 (2006) (arguing why the involvement of
corporations is indispensable for promoting human rights and sustainable development);
Nolan, supra note 10, at 445-46.
12. "The first salient feature of international law is that most of its rules aim at
regulating the behavior of States, not that of individuals. States are the principal actors on
the international scene." CASSESE, supra note 2, at 3.
13. MNCs is used here broadly to include all variations such as transnational
corporations (TNCs) or multinational enterprises (MNEs). See PETER MuCHLINSKI,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12-15 ( 1995); CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, LEGAL
CONTROL OF THE MULTINATI ON AL ENTERPRISE ( 1982).
14. Sands observes: "If the private sector is to have rights and obligations under
international instruments, on what basis can they be excluded from the law making process,
or the traditional inter-governmental arrangements for dispute settlement? . .. [A]s the
activities of the private sector are directly affected by international laws they can
legitimately expect to play a greater role in international affairs, and in international law
making." PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF
GLOBAL RULES 19 (2005).
15. For a discussion of why MNCs should be considered subjects of international law,
see NICOLA JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF
ACCOUNTABILITY 19-35 (2002); Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational
Corporations and International Law: Where from Here? , 19 CONN. J. INT ' L L. 1, 48-56
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Corporations, on the other hand, must have found the offer of
partnership for corporate citizenship quite tempting given a renewed
In addition,
focus on social responsibilities of corporations. 16
corporations perhaps might have thought that an association with the
U .N. in this partnership could somewhat soften the resistance that they
were facing from anti-capitalism, anti-WTO and anti-globalization
movements. 17 In sum, this partnership was a "win-win" situation for
both the actors; 18 both the U .N. and business needed each other badly.
This is what the opening remark of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
sums up.
The Global Compact is one of the many private-public, localglobal, municipal-extraterritorial and voluntary-obligatory initiatives
that aim to define as well as promote social responsibilities of
corporations. The idea for such a Compact is rooted in an address by
the U .N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to the World Economic Forum
in Davos on January 31, 1999. 19 He challenged business leaders to
embrace core principles in the areas of human rights, labor, and the
environment. 20 The Compact was officially launched in New York on

(2003).
16. The precise nature of corporate social responsibilities has been one of the most
contentious issues. The roots of the debate go back to the famous Berle-Dodd exchange in
the early 1930s. Adolph A. Berle, Jr. Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1932). Joseph also refers to the "four waves" of corporate human
rights scrutiny, out of which the first one - related to consumers' right to safe products predates 1990s. Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The
"Fourth Wave" of Corporate Human Rights Society, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 425, 426 (2003); see
also C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
17. Bhagwati argues that people believed MNCs as "the principal beneficiaries, and the
main agents ... of this socially destructive globalization." JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE
OF GLOBALIZATION ix (2004). Much earlier, Vernon wrote that "[t]he multinational
enterprise has come to be seen as the embodiment of almost anything disconcerting about
modem industrial society." RAYMOND VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS: THE
REAL ISSUES 19 ( 1977).
18. "Partnerships like the Global Compact creates a win-win situation for governments,
civil society and the private sector." Betty King, The UN Global Compact: Responsibility
for Human Rights, Labor Relations, and the Environment in Developing Nations, 34
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481, 483 (2001).
19. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on
Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in Davos, U.N.
Doc.
SG/SM/6881
(Feb.
1,
1999),
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/ 19990201.sgsm6881.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2006).
20. Id. A new principle related to "anti-corruption" was added in June 2004. See infra
note 38.
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July 26, 2000. 21 Since then the Global Compact has constantly evolved
and grown, so much so that today it is acclaimed as "the world's largest
and most widely embraced corporate citizenship initiative"22 and hailed
as "one of the Secretary General's most significant achievements. " 23
In this background, this article aims to critically evaluate the
evolution of, and the progress made by, the Global Compact in making
participant corporations "embrace, support and enact" the ten Compact
principles. Part I offers insights into the evolution of the Global
Compact by critically reviewing the major milestones reached in the last
seven years - from the backing of U .N. General Assembly resolutions
to the integrity measures, the Shanghai Declaration, the principles for
responsible investment, and the new governance framework. Part II
elaborates the argument why the Global Compact is still too compact to
be termed global in the true sense. The compactness of the Compact is
highlighted with reference to two aspects: the general and limited scope
of its ten principles and the extent of (non)response as well as
(non)seriousness shown by corporations towards the Compact. It is
argued that the ten principles are too compact to offer any real guidance
to corporations about their social responsibilities. On the other hand, a
survey of the Global Compact participants reveals regional imbalance as
well as a high percentage of non-communicating participants, which in
tum question the globalness of the Compact. This part also investigates
the extent to which the world's top corporations - represented in
Fortune Global 500 and Financial Times Global 500 - have shown
interest in embracing the Global Compact. Part III examines some
major deficiencies of the Global Compact which seriously undermine its
efficacy, e.g., directional uncertainty, lack of enforcement and
independent monitoring, potential for misuse as a marketing tool, and
amorphous role of states. Part IV sums up the finding of this article and
also outlines some challenges that the Compact Office should try to
overcome in order to secure the future of this "public-private"
partnership for corporate citizenship.
Before moving on to Part I, let me offer a definitional signpost and
a caveat for readers. Although the Global Compact seeks to promote
responsible corporate citizenship, it does not define "corporate
21. About
the
Global
Compact,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
22. Global Compact Office, The United Nations Global Compact: Advancing
Corporate
Citizenship
I
(2005),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/2.0.2.pdf. [hereinafter ADv ANCING
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP].
23. COMPACT BOARD MEETING REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
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citizenship."24 Several other similar terms such as "corporate social
responsibility" (CSR), 25 "corporate accountability,"26 "sustainable
business," and "triple bottom line" 27 are also in voyage. These terms by
and large denote a common idea that demands a reorientation in the
place and role of corporations within society. 28 Although no consensual
definition of CSR or corporate citizenship is available, 29 seemingly
these two are used interchangeably. It is possible, however, to draw at
least two distinctions between CSR and corporate citizenship. First,
whereas the CSR discourse is concerned primarily with the nature,
extent, and implementation of corporate responsibilities, corporate
citizenship additionally involves a strategic focus from the standpoint of
corporations. 30 Second, CSR is essentially about the responsibilities

24. Even the definition provided in Black's Law Dictionary - "corporate status in the
state of incorporation" - bears little resemblance to how this term is generally understood.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 364 (8th ed. 2004).
25. "Corporate social responsibility" is generally taken to mean the responsibilities of a
corporation towards its stakeholders and communities in which it operates. See, e.g., JAMES
E. POST ET AL., BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: CORPORATE STRATEGY, PUBLIC POLICY, ETHICS 5677 (9th ed. 1999).
26. Nolan draws a distinction between "corporate accountability" and other terms such
as CSR or corporate citizenship in that the former "implies commitment, legal responsibility
and mechanisms that allow for enforcement of human rights." Nolan, supra note 10, at 448.
27. This implies that the success of a corporation should not be judged merely on the
basis of its financial output but also by its environmental and social performance.
28. Corporations, for example, are no longer expected to behave as only wealth
maximization entities.
29. "The history and contours of the academic debate about corporate social
responsibility - what it is, to whom it is owed, and how it should be policed - is both long
and well known." Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The

United Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a
Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 287, 298 (2006). "The current corporate social responsibility ... agenda is
immature, though the issue that it is concerned with are as old as human endeavor." HALINA
WARD, SWEDISH PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY, LEGAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP
1
(2003),
available
at
http://www.iied.org/SM/CR/documents/
legalissues_corporate.pdf. Wells also thinks that these debates "rarely seem to go
anywhere." C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002).
These observations are similar to the one written in 1980: "Extensive debate has resulted in
little agreement among defenders and opponents of the MNCs in the developing world."
Joseph LaPalombara & Stephen Blank, Multinational Corporations and Developing
Countries, 34 J. INT'LAFF. 119, 119 (1980).
30. Boston College's Center for Corporate Citizenship, for example, says the following
on its website: "Corporate citizenship is the business strategy that shapes the values
underpinning a company's mission and the choices made each day by its executives,
managers and employees as they engage with society." Center for Corporate Citizenship at
What
is
Corporate
Citizenship?,
Boston
College,
http://www.bcccc.net/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page. viewPage&pageid=567 &node ID= 1&pare
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that corporations should/must have towards their stakeholders. But as
"citizenship" implies not only duties but also rights and privileges of
citizens, 31 the idea of corporate citizenship should a priori also include
rights and privileges that corporations should enjoy. 32 In short, as
compared to CSR, the term "corporate citizenship" is wider and it puts
more emphasis on strategy-cum-practice aspects of business.
Finally, a brief caveat is required because one may ask what is new
in this "public-private" partnership as the U.N. "has a history of
interacting with business". 33 The Compact Office sums up what sets
apart the current partnership from previous such attempts:
The Global Compact is also a historic development in terms of
transforming the relationship between the U.N. and the private sector.
During and well after the Cold War environment, the U.N. and the
international business community often had a strained relationship.
Interventionist and ill-fated attempts by the U.N. to regulate business
practices, commodity prices, and technology transfers alienated much
of the international business community. 34

I.

CRITICAL INSIGHT INTO THE COMPACT'S PROGRESS SINCE DAVOS

In the last seven years, the Global Compact has constantly evolved

ntID=473 (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (emphasis added). The website also identifies four
core principles of corporate citizenship: "minimize harm, maximize benefit, be accountable
and responsive to key stakeholders, and support strong financial results." Id.
31. "Citizenship" is defined as: "The legal link between an individual and a particular
state ... under which the individual receives certain rights, privileges, and protections in
return for allegiance and duties." DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW
220 ( 1980) (emphasis added). See also 7 WORDS AND PHRASES 287 (perm. ed., 1979).
32. Corporations are already claiming the protection of "human" rights. See Autronic
AG v. Switzerland, App. No. 12726/87, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (Eur. Court of H.R.);
Michael K. Addo, The Corporation as a Victim of Human Rights Violations, in HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 190
(Michael K. Addo ed., 1999). See generally Jens David Ohlin, Note, Is the Concept of the
Person Necessary for Human Rights?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2005).
33 . Nolan, supra note 10, at 454. Sagafi-nejad also notes that the U.N. has had "an
ebb-and-flow relationship" with MNCs. Tagi Sagafi-nejad, Should Global Rules Have

Legal Teeth? Policing (WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control) vs. Good
Citizenship (UN Global Compact), 10 INT. J. OF Bus. 363, 375 (2005). See also infra note
198.
34. ADVANCING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, supra note 22, at 2. Secretary Kofi Annan in
a recent report submitted to the General Assembly noted: "For the first time in over 60 years
of United Nations history, we are making business and other social actors vital partners in
pursuit of our goals." Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization,
Suppl.
1,
N61/l
(Aug.
16,
2006),
45,
available
at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/461/94/PDF/N0646 l 94.pdf?OpenElement(
last visited Dec. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary General].
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and made commendable progress on several fronts. This part first
describes what the Global Compact is as well as what it is not, and then
outlines the significant milestones that the Compact has reached since it
began its journey in January 1999.

A.

Proposing the Idea of the U.N 's Revival at Davos

As pointed out before, with the launch of Global Compact,
Secretary General Kofi Annan sought to revive and reinvent the
relevance of the U.N., 35 especially in the field of promoting corporate
social responsibilities. Annan observed: "I see the Compact as a chance
for the U.N. to renew itself from within, and to gain greater relevance in
the 21st Century by showing that it can work with non-state actors, as
well as states, to achieve the broad goals on which its members have
agreed." 36 Initially, the Global Compact consisted of nine principles in
the areas of human rights, labor, and the environment. 37 On June 24,
2004, during the Global Compact Leaders Summit, a tenth principle

35 . An editorial in Christian Science Monitor described the Compact as Kofi Annan's
"most creative reinvention" yet of the U.N .. Editorial, A New Global Compact?, CHRISTIAN
Sc1. MONITOR (Boston), Sept. 8, 2000, at 10, quoted in John Gerard Ruggie, Symposium:
"Trade, Sustainability and Global Governance": Keynote Address, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
297' 301 (2002).
36. Global Compact Office, The Global Compact: Report on Progress and Activities 3
(2002),
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/global_compact/ProgressReport%20July%203 .pdf
(last visited Oct. 26, 2006) [hereinafter COMPACT PROGRESS REPORT]; see also Adelle
Blackett, Symposium: Globalization, Accountability, and the Future of Administrative Law:
Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of
Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 443 (2001 ); see generally
Witte & Reinicke, supra note 11.
37. The original language of the nine principles was as follows:
Human Rights - Business is asked to: 1. Support and respect the protection of international
human rights within their sphere of influence; and 2. Make sure their own corporations are
not complicit in human rights abuses.
Labour - Business is asked to uphold: 3. Freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 4. The elimination of all forms of forced
and compulsory labour; 5. The effective abolition of child labour; and 6. The elimination of
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
Environment - Business is asked to: 7. Support a precautionary approach to environmental
challenges; 8. Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and 9.
Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.] Quote,
should be indented.
Global Compact Office, Guide to the Global Compact: A Practical Understanding of the
Vision and Nine Principles 14, http://www.asria.org/ref/library/csrguidelines/lib/gcguide.pdf
(last visited Oct 26, 2006) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT]. The change in the
language of Principles 1 and 2 is worth noting. See infra note 55 please verify that all crossreferencing is correct. For example, this should be "56". I believe it was all right in my
manuscript.
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related to "anti-corruption"38 was added after extensive consultation
with all the participants. 39 It is claimed that the ten principles enjoy
"universal consensus and are derived from" the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Labour Organisation Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development and the U .N. Convention Against
Corruption. 40
The Global Compact is a multi-stakeholder initiative involving
diverse actors such as governments, companies, labor and civil society
organizations, and the U.N. 41 To participate in the Compact, the Chief
Executive Officer of the organization must send a letter "to the U.N.
Secretary-General expressing support for the Global Compact and its
principles."42 The participant is also expected to set in motion changes
to its business operations, publicly advocate the Compact and its
principles, and publish an annual sustainability report regarding the
steps taken to implement the principles.43
The Global Compact "in its simple form is the dissemination of
and adherence to good business practices."44 It calls upon business
enterprises to "embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of
influence, a set of core values" in the four covered areas: human rights,
labor, environment, and anti-corruption. 45 The ten principles of the
Global Compact are quite ambitious in their scope and try to "fill a void
between regulatory regimes, at one end of the spectrum, and voluntary

38. It reads: "Businesses should work against all forms of corruption, including
extortion and bribery." About the Global Compact, The Ten Principles, Anti-Corruption,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AbouttheGC/TheTENPrinciples/anti-corruption.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2006).
39. Global Compact Office, Preliminary Report on the Global Compact Leaders
Summit 1 (2004), http://www.pactoglobal.org.br/doc/summit%20report.pdf (last visited Oct.
26, 2006).
Ten
Principles
of
the
U.N.
Global
Compact,
40. The
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2006) [hereinafter The Ten Principles].
41. Georg Kell, The Global Compact: Origins, Operations, Progress, Challenges, 11 J.
CORP. CITIZENSHIP 35, 37-39 (2003).
42. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF DENMARK & U.N.D.P., IMPLEMENTING THE U.N.
GLOBAL COMPACT: A BOOKLET FOR INSPIRATION 7 (2005), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8. l/dk_book_e.pdf.
43. Id.
44. King, supra note 18, at 482. Ruggie also thinks that the Compact "is intended to
identify, disseminate and promote good practices based on universal principles." Ruggie,
supra note 35, at 301.
45. The Ten Principles of the U.N. Global Compact, supra note 40.
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codes of industry conduct, at the other. " 46
The Compact pursues two "complementary goals": first, making
efforts to internalize the Compact principles as part of business strategy
and operations and second, facilitating "co-operation and collective
problem-solving between different stakeholders."47 At a wider level,
the vision of the Global Compact is "to promote responsible corporate
citizenship so that business can be part of the solution to the challenges
of globalization," e.g., good corporate citizenship could contribute to
establishing a "more sustainable and inclusive global economy."48 If
the Compact is able to engage corporations in overcoming the side
effects of globalization, 49 it should automatically establish the relevance
of the U.N., especially amidst people who feel let down by their
respective governments.
The Global Compact seeks to achieve its objectives by the
following four engagement mechanisms: leadership (promoting
initiatives supporting the Global Compact at all levels); dialogues
(engaging in policy dialogues with all concerned stakeholders); learning
(enabling dissemination of best business practices through sharing of
"examples" and "case studies"); and outreach/network (providing action
platforms, including promotion of public-private partnership projects). 50
It should also be noted that the "Global Compact is not a
regulatory instrument - it does not 'police,' enforce or measure the
behavior or actions of companies. " 51 It is not even a "benchmarking
system that measures good and bad." 52 Since the Compact is a
"learning dialogue and a platform of action," 53 it relies on a range of
unconventional means and strategies to promote respect for its
principles, e.g., principle-based change; risk management; public
accountability; the enlightened self-interest of companies; sharing good

46. COMPACT PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 36, at 4.
47. Kell, supra note 41, at 36.
48. About the Global Compact, supra note 21.
49. See, e.g., JANET DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 126
(2005). Bhagwati, however, argues that "globalization has a human face" already.
BHAGWATI, supra note 17, at x.
50. Kell, supra note 41, at 36-37, 39-40. See also COMPACT PROGRESS REPORT, supra
note 36, at 4-6.
51 . About the Global Compact, supra note 21.
52. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, The UN. Global Compact: Moving to the Business
Mainstream, An Interview with Georg Kell, CORP. RESP. REP., Winter 2005, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9 .5/pwc_int_2005 .pdf (last visited Sept.
27, 2006) [hereinafter An Interview with Kell].
53. Id.
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practices; partnerships, etc. 54

B.

Progress Since Davos

Many aspects of the Global Compact have changed from the time
it started its journey in Davos; the key concepts, modalities for
implementation and the governance framework of the Compact are still
in the process of evolution, 55 the original language of its principles has
been changed, 56 and a new principle related to anti-corruption has been
added.
Because the Compact has undergone "intense
experimentation," 57 there is also an iota of uncertainty associated with
its working. Although it is not possible to discuss all the progress steps
here, some notable landmarks are noted below.

1.

Backing of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions

Among other things, the globalization of trade and terrorism has
exposed the limitations of the predominantly state-centric nature of the
U.N. and gaps in international law generally. One reason that led to this
inadequacy is that non-state actors-and not states-are key players in
both trade and terrorism. 58 The other important variable is that states,
even if they act in cooperation, alone lack the required capacity to
handle global problems, or to ensure the realization of human rights 59

54./d.
55. For example, the Global Compact Advisory Council was formed in Jan. 2002.
Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General to Convene First Meeting of Global
Compact Advisory Council at Headquarters 8 January, U.N. Doc. Note 5705 (Jan. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/note5705.doc.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2006). Recently, new governance framework has been proposed. See THE GLOBAL
COMPACT,
THE
GLOBAL
COMPACT'S
NEXT
PHASE
(2005),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/2. 3/gc _gov_framew. pdf.
56. For example, Principle 1 initially provided that the world business should "support
and respect the protection of international human rights within their sphere of influence."
GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 37, at 14. It now reads: "Businesses should
support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights." The Ten
Principles of the U.N. Global Compact, supra note 40. Two differences are noteworthy.
First, the phrase "within their sphere of influence" is removed from principle 1 and added as
a qualifier to all the ten principles. Id.; GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 37, at
14. Second, "international human rights" is qualified by "proclaimed," implying thereby
that some international human rights are not official, or publicly declared to be so. The Ten
Principles of the U.N. Global Compact, supra note 40.
57. Kell, supra note 41, at 36.
58. See Surya Deva, From 3112 to 9111: Future of Human Rights?, 39 ECON & POL
WKLY 5198 (2004 ).
59. King, for example, argues: "Protecting human rights everywhere is too big a job for
governments alone. To be successful we need partners ... we need the corporate players in
the global market place to ensure the access to economic, social, and cultural rights." King,
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and the eight U.N. Millennium Development Goals. 60 U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 55/215 tries to respond to some of these
challenges by stressing the need for partnerships between the U.N.
member states and the private sector. 61 Among others, such a
partnership "between the U.N. (the global political system) and the
TNCs (the global economic system)" is also required to sustain
globalization by overcoming its socio-economic imbalances.62 The
Global Compact certainly provided a successful example of a much
desired public-private partnership, for which it legitimately claims
pride. 63
Three subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly further
support and endorse the Compact model of partnership. Resolution
56176 encourages "the private sector to accept and implement the
principle of good corporate citizenship" and also underlines "the fact
that cooperation between the United Nations and all relevant partners, in
particular the private sector, shall serve the purposes and principles
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."64 Resolution 58/129
builds on this premise and encourages the private sector "to take into
account not only the economic and financial, but also the
developmental, social, human rights, gender and environmental
implications of their undertakings. "65 It is also stressed that such
supra note 18, at 483.
60. A recent General Assembly resolution underlined "the fact that cooperation
between the United Nations and all relevant partners, including the private sector, shall
serve the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and can
make concrete contributions to the realization of the Millennium Development Goals."
G.A. Res. 60/215, Preamble, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/215 (Mar. 29, 2006). See also Report of
the Secretary General, supra note 34, at 45. The Millennium Development Goals are
available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) [hereinafter
U.N. Millenium Development Goals].
61. G.A.
Res.
55/215,
U.N.
Doc.
A/RES/55/215
(Mar.
6,
2001),
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/U.N.DOC/GEN/N00/572/05/PDF/N0057205.pdf?OpenElemen
t (last visited Oct. 28, 2006). But see Alexis M Taylor, The U.N. and the Global Compact,
17 N. Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 975, 980-83 (2001). He concludes: "The question remains as
to whether the U .N. has exceeded Charter-based limitations of working towards world peace
through the promotion of globalisation and the Global Compact." Id. at 983.
62. David M. Bigge, Bring on the Bluewash: A Social Constructivist Argument Against
Using Nike v. Kasky to Attack the U.N Global Compact, 14 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 6, 10
(2004).
63. "The Global Compact is also a historic development in terms of transforming the
relationship between the United Nations and the private sector." ADVANCING CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 22, at 2.
64. G.A. Res. 56176, iii! 6, 8, U.N. Doc. AIRES/56176 (Jan. 24, 2002).
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/U.N.DOC/GEN/NOl/490/02/PDF/N0149002.pdf?OpenElemen
t (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
65. G.A. Res. 58/129, ii 11, U.N. Doc AIRES/58/129 (Feb. 19, 2004).
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partnerships "should focus on the achievement of concrete results" and
should be founded on the purposes and principles of the U .N. as
outlined in the Charter. 66 The clearest endorsement of the Global
Compact and its techniques is provided by the recent General Assembly
Resolution 60/125. 67 The resolution not only "encourages responsible
business practices, such as those promoted by the Global Compact" but
also "encourages the Global Compact Office to promote the sharing of
best practices and positive action through learning, dialogue and
partnerships. " 68
These resolutions legitimize the working of the Global Compact
and the U .N. 's engagement with non-state "private" actors. This should
also encourage more and more corporations to join the initiative.
2.

Integrity Measures for Brand Management

The Global Compact Office is concerned about the "brand
management" of its initiative, 69 and therefore, has taken integrity
measures to ensure that participants do not misuse the name or goodwill
of the Compact. 70 Three measures deserve special mention. 71 First, the
Compact participants are expected "to communicate annually to all
stakeholders their progress in implementing the GC principles."72
Should a participant fail to do so "for two years in a row, that
participant would be labeled 'inactive' on the Global Compact
website." 73 Because of its special importance, the policy regarding
Communication on Progress (COP) has been dealt with in more detail in

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/U.N.DOC/GEN/N03/502/32/PDF/N0350232.pdf?OpenElemen
t (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
66. Id.
67. G.A. Res. 60/215, supra note 60.
68. Id.
69. An Interview with Kell, supra note 52. This is again emphasized during the
inaugural meeting of the Global Compact Board. Compact Board Meeting Report, supra
note 1, at 8-10.
70. United Nations Global Compact, Note on Integrity Measures, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/gc_integrity_mesures.pdf (last visited Nov.
7, 2006) [hereinafter Global Compact Note on Integrity].
71. The integrity measures have three essential elements: "i) the Communication on
Progress (COP) policy; ii) the Global Compact brand and logo policy and iii) the complaint
process." Compact Board Meeting Report, supra note 1, at 8.
72. Global Compact Note on Integrity, supra note 70, at§ 3.
73. Id. In fact, the Global Compact Office has now started listing companies as
"inactive" if they fail to submit a COP within three years of joining the Global Compact, or
within two years of submitting their last COP. "Inactive Participants", available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/CommunicatingProgress/inactive_participants.html (last
visited Nov. 27, 2006).
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the next section.
Second, the Compact Office has formulated and released a Logo
Policy that specifies permissible and non-permissible uses of the logo. 74
Under the Policy, the Compact Office "permit[s] its participants and
other stakeholders to use the Global Compact logo only in the context
of their activities promoting the Global Compact and its goals, but not
in any manner that suggests or implies that the Global Compact Office
has endorsed or approved of the activities, products, and/or services of
the organization, or that the Global Compact Office is the source of any
such activities, products, and/or services." 75 In short, the participants
are not allowed to use the Compact logo to gain purely commercial or
economic benefits.
Finally, a complaint process has been put in place. If "a complaint
of systematic or egregious abuse is found not to be prima facie
frivolous," the Global Compact Office will forward the complaint to the
concerned participating company with a request to respond in writing
"directly to the complaining party, with a copy to the Global Compact
Office."76 The Compact Office could also provide guidance and
assistance to the participating company concerned "to remedy the
situation that is the subject matter of the complaint in order to align the
actions of the company with its commitments to the Global Compact
principles." 77

3.

COP Policy

The COP policy, which is part of the Compact' s integrity
measures, was introduced in January 2003. "Companies are asked to
communicate publicly on their progress through major medium[ s] of
communication, such as annual reports or websites, allowing
stakeholders to evaluate the companies' commitment to the Global
Compact."78 If a company does not publish a sustainability or annual
report, the COP should be communicated through other channels - such
as "websites, press releases, official statements, company notices" - in

74. United Nations Global Compact, The Global Compact Logo Policy, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/gc_logo_policy.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2006) [hereinafter Policy on the Use of the Global Compact Name and Logos].
75. Id.
76. United
Nations
Global
Compact,
Integrity
Measures ,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/integrity.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
77. Id.
78 . United Nations Global Compact, Notable Communications on Progress,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/CommunicatingProgress/cop_practice.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Communications on Progress.].
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which stakeholders would "expect to read about the company's major
economic, social and environmental engagements."79 The Compact
participants are also expected to post on the Global Compact website an
electronic version of their COP, along with a URL link to the web page
where the document is available. 80 Even small and medium scale
enterprises are encouraged to submit COPs, though in their case COPs
need not be as exhaustive or detailed as expected from MNCs. 81
The Compact website offers guidelines on how to comply with the
annual requirement of submitting COPs82 and also lists some of the
notable COPs. 83 Regarding each of the ten principles, the reporting
should keep in mind the four components: commitment, systems,
action, and performance. 84 The Compact Office has released a practical
guide that illustrates how these four components could be reported
regarding each of the ten principles and also provides tips on how to
find evidence that demonstrate the progress made on the Compact
principles. 85
The COP Guidelines lay down that a COP should include the
following three elements. 86 First, a statement of continued support for
the Global Compact from the Chief Executive Officer, Chairman or
other senior executive. The requirement that such a statement must
come from a senior representative is emphasized to signify that "the
Global Compact is considered a commitment deserving of the highest
level of attention." 87 Second, a description of practical actions that
participants have taken to implement the Compact principles during the
previous fiscal year. Undoubtedly, ongoing corporate actions might be
necessary to implement the Compact principles. 88 Even so, the COPs
79. United Nations Global Compact, A Practical Guide to Communication on
Progress,
at
5,
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/communication_on_progress/4.3/pock_guide.pdf
(last visited Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter A Practical Guide to Communication on Progress].
80. Id.
81. Id. at6.
82. United Nations Global Compact, Global Compact Guidelines for "Communication
on
Progress,"
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/CommunicatingProgress/cop_guidelines. pdf (last visited
Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Global Compact Guidelines for "Communication on Progress"].
83. Id.
84. A Practical Guide to Communication on Progress, supra note 79, at 8.
85. Id. at 8-9.
86. Global Compact Guidelines for "Communication on Progress, "supra note 82.
87. A Practical Guide to Communication on Progress, supra note 79, at 4.
88. During an interview, Norman Walker, Head, Human Resources, Novartis
International said: "I can't say we will meet all of our requirement[s] today. It's a journey
we have started with the purpose of seeing that our standards are achieved." Tavis, infra
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should identify yearly achievements, for "yearly actions signify a
commitment to continuous improvement. " 89 Third, the measurement of
outcomes or expected outcomes using, as much as possible, indicators
or metrics such as the Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines. 90 Instead
of merely describing a policy or program, the performance should be
measured and expressed in quantitative terms. 91
4.

New Governance Framework

In order to strengthen the quality, integrity and governance
components of the Global Compact, a new framework was approved by
the U.N. Secretary General in August 2005. 92 This was considered
necessary because "with more than 2,400 [now more than 3,600]
participants worldwide and nearly 50 country networks, the Global
Compact has reached a stage of maturity and scope that demand greater
focus, transparency, and sustained impact. " 93 It is proposed that the
governance functions will be shared by (i) Triennial Global Compact
Leaders Summit, (ii) Global Compact Board, (iii) Local Networks, (iv)
Annual Local Networks Forum, (v) Global Compact Office, and (vi)
Inter-Agency Team. 94
There will, however, be no change in the Global Compact' s
founding principles, mission, objectives, open-voluntary nature of the
initiative, and the leadership model. 95 Corporations must have found
this announcement reassuring given the fear that the Compact might
turn into a regulatory instrument, or that the Compact Office might get
tough on free riders.
It may be worthwhile to detail the composition of, and expectations
from, the Compact Board. The Board will consist of twenty members
from four constituency groups: business, civil society, labor, and the

note 133, at 742.
89. A Practical Guide to Communication on Progress, supra note 79, at 4.
90. Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 2002, available at
http://www.globalreporting.org/guidelines/2002/gri_2002_guidelines.pdf (last visited Nov.
1, 2006).
91. See Id.
92. United Nations Global Compact, The Global Compact 's Next Phase 1, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/2.3/gc_gov_framew.pdf (last visited
Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter The Global Compact's Next Phase].
93. United
Nations
Global
Compact,
Global
Compact
Governance,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/stages_of_development.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2006).
94. Id. See also The Global Compact 's Next Phase, supra note 92, at 6.
95. The Global Compact's Next Phase, supra note 92, at 2.
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U.N .. 96 Apart from three ex-officio members coming from the U.N.
(Secretary General, Head of the Compact Office and Chair of the Global
Compact Foundation), eleven will come from business, four from civil
society and two from labor. 97 Thus, the dominance of corporations in
the Board is apparent. 98 The Compact Board will provide "ongoing
strategic and policy advice" to the corporate citizenship initiative,
including by "making recommendations to the Global Compact Office,
participants and other stakeholders."99 It will also be "encouraged to
assist in raising funds and contributions in kind for global events,
activities and the publication of tool kits." 100 The Board will hold an
annual formal meeting but "the constituency groups will be expected to
interact with the Global Compact Office on an ongoing basis." 101
On April 20, 2006, the U.N. Secretary General appointed business,
labor and civil society leaders from around the world to serve on the
Global Compact Board. 102 The inaugural meeting of the Board was
held on June 28, 2006, in which Kofi Annan committed to encourage
his successor to endorse and support the Global Compact. 103

5.

Global Compact Foundation

Although the Global Compact has received an endorsement from
the U.N. General Assembly through various resolutions, it "receives
almost no funding from the regular budget of the United Nations." 104
Consequently, in order to meet its costs of activities such as events,
meetings, publication, translation and tools, the Global Compact Office,
on April 19, 2006, launched a non-profit foundation, the Foundation for
the Global Compact. 105 The Foundation has been authorized to raise
funds on behalf of the Compact Office. 106 The Foundation will seek

96. Id. at 6.
97. Id. at 7.
98. See Nolan, supra note 10, at 465.
99. The Global Compact's Next Phase, supra note 92, at 6.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Press Release, United Nations Global Compact, Secretary-General Appoints
Global
Compact
Board
(Apr.
20,
2006),
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/news_archives/2006_04 _20 .html
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2006).
103. Compact Board Meeting Report, supra note 1, at 2, 5.
104. Foundation for the United Global Compact, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.globalcompactfoundation.org/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
for
the
United
Global
Compact,
Index,
105. Foundation
http://www.globalcompactfoundation.org/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
for
the
Global
Compact,
Purpose,
106. Foundation
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voluntary contributions from the Compact participants and other
stakeholders.
To safeguard the integrity of the Global Compact, "funds raised
through the Foundation will not be used to pay the salaries of Global
Compact staff. The Foundation will also not exert any influence on
Global Compact Office strategy and operations." 107 It is encouraging
that the Compact Office is aware of the problems associated with such a
mechanism of fund raising. But still, it may be desirable to draw a
detailed funding policy to preserve the integrity and independence of
the initiative.
6.

Shanghai Declaration

Another step in the evolution ~rocess of the Global Compact was
the 15-point Shanghai Declaration. 1 8 The Declaration was approved on
December 1, 2005 by international business leaders and representatives
of government and civil society at the close of the Global Compact
Summit in Shanghai. 109 Out of fifteen points, whereas the first five
reiterate the "role of business in society," the next eight points canvass
the "actions for responsible business." 110 The last two points of the
Declaration elaborate the "role of govemments." 111 Of these fifteen
points, a few more significant ones may be noted here. First, it is
emphasized that despite the "globalisation of business," the expansion
of markets around the world remains "an uneven and fragile process"
and therefore, universal principles should be embedded in the
marketplace "for creating more robust and equitable markets." 112
Second, points four and five of the Declaration together charter a
double barrel - having both positive and negative elements - "business
case" for being responsible corporate citizens. 113 In sum, good

http://www.globalcompactfoundation.org/about/purpose.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
107. Press Release, Foundation for Global Compact, Foundation for the Global
Compact
Launched
(Apr.
19,
2006),
available
at
http://www.globalcompactfoundation.org/news/releases/launch_press_releasel 70406.pdf
(last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
108. U.N. Global Compact Summit, Shanghai, Nov.30-Dec.l, 2005, Shanghai
Declaration,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.l_news_archives/2005_12_01b/shang
hai_declaration.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Shanghai Declaration].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. iii! 1, 2.
113. Id. iii! 4, 5. For "business case," see generally Scott Greathead, The Multinational
and the "New Stakeholder": Examining the Business Case for Human Rights, 35 VAND. J.
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corporate citizenship is presented not only as a business opportunity to
gain and maintain competitive advantage in market settings, but also as
an important strategy for risk management. 114
Third, the Declaration reaffirms the importance of corporations
forming alliances, partnerships and collaborative efforts with like
minded businesses and other societal organs. 115 Corporations also
"commit to become proactive in critical areas where our voices and
competencies can substantively contribute to the solutions of priority
challenges, such as HIVIAIDS and other critical health concerns, and
community
engagement
for
sustainable
and long-term
development." 116 Although not expressly mentioned, the "priority
challenf es" seemingly refer to the U .N. Millennium Development
Goals. 1 7
Fourth, the Shanghai Declaration also outlines corporate
expectations from governments in promoting the corporate citizenship
initiative. Since "the rule of law, and transparent and predictable
regulatory efforts" are necessary to sustain good corporate initiatives,
the governments are asked to "actively encourage principled corporate
practices and promote accountability and transparency." 118
Governments, in addition, are requested to "provide for and strengthen a
multilateral tradinf system . . . [and] further improve the international
financial regime." 19 The Declaration, therefore, is not merely about
corporate social responsibilities. By expressly including corporate
expectations from governments, the Shanghai Declaration also testifies
TRANSNAT'L L. 719 (2002); David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate
Performance: The Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J.
ENVTL. L. 151 (2004); Joshua A. Newberg; Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory
Disclosure, and the Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253 (2005). See also
European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal
Opportunities, The Business Case for Diversity: Good Practices in the Workplace (2005),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamental_rights/pdf/events/busicase_en.p
df; SANJAY SHARMA & MARK STARIK, STAKEHOLDERS, THE ENVIRONMENT,
AND SOCIETY (Sanjay Sharma & Mark Starik eds., 2004 ).
114. Shanghai Declaration, supra note 108, ~~ 4, 5. The Executive Head of the Global
Compact Office made the risk management justification more explicit in an interview:
"[T]he whole issue is ultimately one of risk management. More companies are seeing that
getting it wrong can be very costly. They are seeing that if they make a mistake on the
environmental front, on the social front, on workplace issues, such as sweatshops - you
name it- the costs can be huge." An Interview with Kell, supra note 52 (emphasis added).
115. Shanghai Declaration, supra note 108, ~~ 7,8.
116. Id.~ 13.
117. U.N. Millennium Development Goals, supra note 60.
118. Shanghai Declaration, supra note 108, ~ 14.
119. Id. at~ 15.

Published by SURFACE, 2006

19

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 4

126

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 34: 107

to the growing leverage of corporations vis-a-vis states.

7.

Compact Quarterly

In January 2005, the Global Compact launched the Compact
Quarterly, an electronic journal that "endeavors to provide Global
Compact participants, stakeholders and observers with a range of
thought-provoking articles, interviews, and updates on topics related to
the initiative, as well as to corporate responsibility in general." 120 The
Compact Quarterly replaces the Global Compact E-Newsletter. The
journal is published in an electronic form, but a printed compendium
will be produced at the end of each year. Although a printed format
could be needed to reach those stakeholders who do not have access to
the internet, efforts should still be made to ensure that the printing and
distribution is in conformity with Principle 8 of the Compact. 121
8.

Engagement with Academic Partners

On March 29, 2006, the Compact Office sent a letter to open a
consultation, which lasted until June 30, 2006, with its academic
partners. 122 The consultation focused on the "(1) mission of academic
institutions within the Global Compact; (2) range of activities they
should embrace to advance its goals; (3) conditions and procedures for
participation; and (4) a proposal on the future governance of the
Academic Network." 123
The Compact Office's initiative to engage with academic
community and educational institutions is laudable. Academia could
play a vital role in spreading a critical understanding of the corporate
citizenship initiative through education, research and writing. In
addition, if the curricula in business, management, and law schools are
aligned with the agenda of corporate citizenship, they could ~rovide
critical training to current and future corporate executives. 1 4 By
120. COMPACT
QUARTERLY,
available
at
http://www.enewsbuilder.net/globalcompact/indexOOOl 18654.cfm (last visited Mar. 31,
2006).
121. Principle 8 reads: "Businesses should undertake initiatives to promote greater
environmental responsibility." United Nations Global Compact, Principle Eight, available
at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/The TenPrincip les/principle8.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2006).
122. Letter from Georg Kell, Executive Head, U.N. Global Compact Office, Office of
the Secretary-General to the Academic Community (March 29, 2006), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9. l_news_archives/fff/
ac_netw_032006.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
123. Id.
124. Notably, academic institutions have agreed to develop Principle for Responsible
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providing such training, educational institutions could fill in an existing
fundamental gap that does not allow a proper balancing between wealth
maximization and promotion of human rights by corporations. 125
Finally, this engagement should provide impetus to the humanization of
corporate law by infusing corporate human rights responsibilities into
it.126

9.

Principles for Responsible Investment

On April 27, 2006, Secretary General Kofi Annan launched
principles for responsible investment (PRI), which have been signed by
the heads of leading institutional investors from sixteen countries,
representing more than $2 trillion in U.S. assets. 127 The process of
drafting PRI was coordinated by the Global Compact along with the
U .N. Environment Program Finance Initiative. There are in total six
principles which specify multiple actions regarding each of the
principles. 128 In sum, participating investors are expected to incorporate
"environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues" into
their investment analysis, decision making, and policies. 129 Participants
should also seek disclosure on ESG issues from entities in which they
invest, promote the implementation of principles within the industry,
and report on the progress made towards implementing these

Business Education. "Academic Institutions Agree to Develop Principles for Responsible
Business
Education,"
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/news_archives/2006_10_26 .html
(last
visited Dec. 4, 2006).
125. See Surya Deva, Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000: Overcoming Hurdles in
Enforcing Human Rights Obligations Against Overseas Corporate Hands of Local
Corporations, 8 NEWCASTLE L. REV. 87, 110-11 (2004) [hereinafter Corporate Code of
Conduct Bill 2000].
126. See, e.g., Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 299(1)(/) and 1013D(l)(l), (Austl.) available
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172; Company Law Reform Bill,
2005,
§§
156(3)(d),
390(4),
HL
Bill
34,
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldbills/034/2006034.pdf. See also Deva,
supra note 11, at 731-33, 748-49.
127. Press Release, United Nations, United Nations Secretary-General Launches
'Principles
for
Responsible
Investment'
(Apr.
27,
2004),
available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/news_archives/2006_ 04_2 7 .html. (last
visited Nov. 1, 2006). See also U.N.PRl.org, http://www.unpri.org/ (last visited Nov. 1,
2006).
128. U.N. Global Compact & U.N. Environment Program Financial Initiative,
Principles
for
Responsible
Investment,
at
6-7,
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9. l_news_archives/2006_ 04_2 7I
pri_brochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Principles for Responsible
Investment].
129. Id. at 6.
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principles. 130
Because PRis are voluntary and aspirational, no regulatory or legal
sanctions follow on non-compliance, although "reputational risks" may
result. 131 It is noteworthy that the PRI are underpinned by the "business
case" hypothesis, 132 in that they are "based on the premise that ESG
issues can affect investment performance and that the appropriate
consideration of these issues is part of delivering superior risk-adjusted
retums." 133 However, as I have argued elsewhere, the business case
hypothesis should be accepted with some caution. 134

II.

REVIEWING THE SCOPE AND PROGRESS: STILL Too COMPACT TO BE
GLOBAL?

The Compact Progress Report, 135 various case studies 136 or
examples by companies, 137 and a report on impact assessment prepared
by McKinsey & Co. 138 document the progress as well as the outreach
that the Global Compact has achieved since its inception. However, it
is argued that the Compact is still too compact to be considered truly
global, the compactness being in terms of the general language and
limited scope of its principles, and the extent of (non)response or

130. Id.
131. Id. at 10.
132. See Greathead, supra note 113; Monsma, supra note 113; Newberg, supra note
113; European Commission, supra note 113.
133. Principles for Responsible Investment, supra note 127, at 8.
134. See Deva, supra note 11, 745-47.
135. COMPACT PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 36, at 10-30. See also Kell, supra note
41, at 41-45.
136. See THE GLOBAL COMPACT LEARNING FORUM, FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE
(2006), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/princ_prac. pdf
(last visited Oct. 31, 2006). The report contains a disclaimer that it is "intended strictly as a
learning document and should not be interpreted to indicate either effective or ineffective
practices." Id. See also Lee A. Tavis, Novartis and the U.N. Global Compact Initiative, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735 (2003).
137. See, e.g., Association for Sustainable & Responsible Investment in Asia, Guide to
the Global Compact: A Practical Understanding of the Vision and Nine Principles,
available at http://www.asria.org/ref/library/csrguidelines/lib/gcguide.pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2006) [hereinafter Guide to the Global Compact].
138. McKinsey & Co., Assessing the Global Compact's Impact 2, 9 (2004),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.l_news_archives/2004_06_09/
imp_ass.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2006). The report concludes that "the Global Compact has
had noticeable, incremental impact on companies, the U.N., governments and other civil
society actors" and that it has "built up a solid participating case and strong local network
structure". Id. at 2, 9. The report, however, also acknowledges that the Compact has acted
"primarily as an accelerator and facilitator of action, rather than the dominant force for
change" in companies' actions, behavior or action. Id. at 3-5.
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(non)seriousness of corporations. This part examines the two-fold
compactness of the Global Compact.

A.

Compact, General and Vague Principles

In order to keep it simple and attractive for corporations, 139 the ten
principles of the Global Compact are basically "one-liners," 140 at best an
example of a "minimalist code" of corporate conduct. 141 Therefore, the
principles hardly provide adequate and concrete guidance to
corporations about the conduct expected from them: 142 "Many of the
[Global Compact's] principles cannot be defined at this time with the
precision required for a viable code of conduct." 143 The generalitycum-vagueness of the Compact principles is counter-productive from
the perspective of both sincere and insincere corporate citizens. The
language of these principles is so general that insincere corporations can
easily circumvent or comply with them without doing anything to
promote human rights or labor standards. 144 On the other hand, even a
sincere corporate citizen like Novartis finds the language too general to
be implemented: "The generality of the Global Compact principles
needed to be particularized for the specific Novartis environment as a
first step in implementation." 145 A certain level of generality or
139. "Participating companies have lauded the voluntary approach and vague
principles. In a recent Financial Times article, a Volkswagon executive posited the benefits
of nine principles that are 'easy to grasp and communicate ... and there is no strict code of
conduct."' Bigge, supra note 62, at 11 citing Hugh Williamson, Signing Up to Corporate
Citizenship, FINANCIAL TIMES (U.K.), February 12, 2003.
140. David Weissbrodt, Businesss and Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 66 (2005)
(indicating that the Global Compact "contains ten short sentences.").
141. Sean Murphy concedes that "[a] minimalist code for codes might look something
like the U.N. Global Compact, simply calling for MNCs to adhere to codes that address
certain core issues, such as labor, human rights, environmental harm, and corruption." Sean
D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 425 (2005).
142. See generally, Klaus M. Leisinger, On corporate Responsibility for Human Rights,
available at http://www.novartisfoundation.com/pdf/leisinger_contribution_hr_business.pdf
(last visited Oct. 30, 2006). Leisinger argues that "ambiguous terms are used that are given
a variety of meanings by society's different stakeholders." Id. at 7. See also Nolan, supra
note 10, at 460 ("[T]he Compact does little to advance the debate toward clarifying what the
key human rights issues are for business.").
143. Ruggie, supra note 35, at 304. For example, "no consensus exists on what 'the
precautionary principle' is." Id.
144. A.A. Fatouros argues that "[a] text referring to a course of conduct in broad terms
sets few actual limits on the freedom of those it seeks to regulate .... " A. A. Fatouros, On
the Implementation of International Codes of Conduct: An Analysis of Future Experience,
30 AM. U. L. REV. 941, 955 (1981).
145. Tavis, supra note 136, at 740. Again, "[t]he Global Compact is not specific in its
seventh principles, asking firms to '[s]upport a precautionary approach to environmental
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flexibility in guiding principles of any international initiative is a
desirable virtue, 146 but not if it could be taken to include or exclude
anything as per the individual corporate convenience.
Let us consider the language of some of the Compact principles.
Principle 1 provides that, "businesses should support and respect the
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights." 147
This
principle, thus, does not elaborate on what such "internationally
proclaimed human rights" are and what actions "supporting" and
"respecting" of such rights would entail. Similarly, a mere statement
that businesses should "make sure that they are not complicit in human
rights abuses" 148 does not provide much help to corporations. What
amounts to complicity in a given business scenario has proved a
complex area that requires careful exploration. 149 Leisinger, for
example, asks: "[I]n what cases does a company become 'complicit' in
human rights abuses through its normal business activities? What kind
of proximity to abuses by the state, by terrorists, by individuals, or by
other companies would justify the negative judgment of being complicit
in human rights violations? These questions are answered in many ways
by different stakeholders ...." 150
The Compact Office though has tried to infuse some certainty into
the principles by elaborating some key terms used herein. For example,
Implementing the Global Compact: A Booklet for Inspiration explains
three types of complicity: direct, beneficial and direct. 151 Companies are
advised to "actively avoid all kinds of direct and indirect complicity." 152
challenges."' Id. at 743.
146. "The Global Compact is very flexible in practice and can be adapted to the
situation and reality of the individual company. The company decides for itself in which
way and how fast it will implement the Global Compact. It means that the company decides
for itself what to prioritize, where to concentrate its efforts and which methods to employ."
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK AND U.N.D.P., supra note 42, at Cover Page
147. The Ten Principles, supra note 40.
148. Id. at Principle 2.
149. John Gerard Ruggie rightly argues that "no consensus exists, even among
advocates, on where to draw the boundaries around corporate 'non-complicity' in human
rights abuses." Ruggie, supra note 35, at 304. See also Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi,
Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 339 (2001); Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to
Rangoon: An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of
Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91 (2002). The U.N. Special
Representative on Business and Human Rights has been requested to investigate this issue.
See
Business
&
Human
Rights
Resource
Centre,
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Gettingstarted/U .N .SpecialRepresentative (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
150. Leisinger, supra note 142, at 3.2
151. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK & U.N.D.P., supra note 42, at 10.
152. Id.
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The Booklet also provides a test to do a self-evaluation of complicity.
A company in doubt should ask: "What would be the effect on
violations if our company or other similar companies did not participate
in the activity in question or did not work with the partner in
question?" 153 Although the three types of complicity are defined quite
broadly, the application of suggested test may produce narrow results.
Let us hypothetically apply the test to the controversial role of Yahoo,
Microsoft, Google and Cisco in regards to internet censorship in
China. 154 Arguably, by applying the test, all four corporations could
come to the conclusion that irrespective of their role there would be
censorship and control over what internet users might surf in China. So,
they are not complicit in the instant internet censorship. If the test
brings such a result, then it is perhaps not satisfactory.
The stand taken by BHP regarding the obligation flowing from
Principle 3 of the Compact - which lays down that "businesses should
uphold . . . the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining" - further illustrates how fragile the Compact principles are.
Even though the plain text of this provision should prima facie require
BHP (or any corporation for that matter), which has committed to
support and advance the Compact principles, to institutionalize
"collective bargaining," 155 BHP continues to require its new employees
to sign individual contracts. 156 In fact, BHP disputes that concerned
Principle directs "that employment be based on collective
bargaining." 157 What makes the matter worse is that even the Global

153. Id. (emphasis in original).
154. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNDERMINING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CHINA:
THE ROLE OF YAHOO!, MICROSOFT AND GOOGLE (2006), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/business/_ Undermining_Freedom_of_Expression_in_China. pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2006); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "RACE TO THE BOTTOM": CORPORATE
COMPLICITY
IN
CHINESE
INTERNET
CENSORSHIP
(2006),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/china0806webwcover. pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2006); Surya Deva, Yahoo! Free Speech in China, ONLINE OPINION (Feb. 22, 2006),
available at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=4178 (last visited Nov. 7,
2006).
155. The Ten Principles, supra note 40, at Principle 3.
156. See Correspondence between the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU),
BHP & The Global Compact Office: available at http://www.cfmeu.asn.au/miningenergy/policy/GC071103 .pdf;http://www.cfmeu.asn.au/miningenergy/policy/GCl 10803.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2006). The BHP, in fact, claims that it
offers a "choice," even to its new employees. Id. ("But new employees have a choice. If
they want to join BHP Billition, they can apply to join but we do require them to sign the
individual contract.").
157. Letter from BHP to ACTU (June 16, 2003) (on file with author). See also Letter
BHP
to
Mr.
Kofi
Annan
(June
17,
2003),
available
at
from
http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bbContentRepository/Policies/LettertoKofiAnnanUnitedNation
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Compact Office seems to agree with this (mis)interpretation of Principle
3 by BHP. 158 Bigge rightly points out that "the Global Compact relies
on language rather than action, hoping to change the frames of the
construct rather than force companies to adhere to externally-imposed
rules." 159
Also, we may recall that the Compact principles are subject to a
general rider, that is, companies need to take measures only "within
their sphere of influence." 160 What constitutes the "sphere of influence"
of a given corporation, though fundamental to the efficacy of Compact
principles, is a matter of uncertainty and speculation. For example, will
it include the subsidiary and affiliate concerns of a parent corporation?
Furthermore, will it include the supply chains of a corporation? If yes,
to what extent? Point twelve of the Shanghai Declaration seems to
address this issue vis-a-vis the supply chains as corporations agree to
"ensure that supply chain capacities are built to effectively implement
the U.N. Global Compact." 161 But the extent to which corporations
would go to ensure that their supply chains have the required capacity to
implement the Compact principles is still to be seen. Also, it cannot be
said with certainty whether all the subsidiaries of a parent corporation
will be treated as entities within the sphere of influence of the parent.
Logically, they should be so treated.
Undoubtedly, in order to remedy the deficit of generality and
vagueness of principles, the Compact Office is constantly offering
various tools, publications, and guidance notes on its website. 162 Some
s170603.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2006). Notably, BHP relies upon an official document
released by the Global Compact Office itself to undermine the obligation related to
collective bargaining in Principle 3. See Guide to the Global Compact, supra note 37, at 3032.
158. See Letter from George Kell, Executive Head of Global Compact, to Ian Wood,
Vice President BHP Billiton (Dec. 1, 2003) (on file with author), available at
http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bb/sustainableDevelopment/policiesAndKeyDocuments.jsp
(follow "United Nations' Letter 1 December 2003" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2006)
("The Global Compact does not prescribe any particular form of workplace arrangements.
Hence, we do not expect participants to change their industrial relations framework as a
result of signing on to the Global Compact.").
159. Bigge, supra note 62, at 11.
160. The Ten Principles, supra note 40 (emphasis added).
161. Shanghai Declaration, supra note 108, ,-i 12. Klaus Leisinger concurs: "For most
of the companies that have signed on to the U.N. Global Compact, the sphere of influence
extends beyond the factory site and includes immediate business partners and suppliers."
Leisinger, supra note 142, at 14. During the recent Global Compact Board meeting, one
member also noted "the importance of encouraging participants to embed the Global
Compact into their supply chains." COMPACT BOARD MEETING REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
162. United Nations Global Compact, Global Compact Tools and Publications,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/recent_publications.html (last visited
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of these guiding techniques, especially the company examples or case
studies, might prove useful, but it requires further investigation and
empirical research on how effective these means would be in providing
guidance to corporations in actual, complex business situations.
B.

Extent of Corporate (Non)Response and (Non)Seriousness

In order to judge the response and "on paper" seriousness 163 of
corporations towards the Global Compact, this section analyzes the
available data on three counts. First, apart from looking at the regional
distribution of the Compact participants (see infra Chart 1), the total
number of Compact participants is contrasted with the total number of
MNCs and their subsidiaries. This should help in appreciating whether
the Global Compact is really global in terms of its participants.
Second, a simple hypothesis is invoked to measure the extent of
(non)seriousness shown by the Compact participants. If a participant
fails to develop even a COP, it could not be serious about embracing the
Compact principles. 164 Fourteen countries from six continents are
selected through purposive sampling. 165 The percentage of "noncommunicating" participants in these fourteen countries is compared
with the total number of participants from such countries (see infra
Chart 2).
In addition, the data of fourteen countries' noncommunicating participants is compared with the global average of noncommunicating participants (see infra Chart 3). March 18, 2006 was
the cut off date for collecting the data. To see if there is any significant
fluctuation m the percentage of total or non-communicating

Oct. 26, 2006).
163. Many corporations might not show seriousness even on paper or online. For
example, Cisco has not bothered to update information on its webpage related to the
Compact in view of the addition of the tenth principle. See Cisco, U.N. Global Compact,
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac22 7/about_cisco_corp_citi_global_compact.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2006).
164. During the inaugural meeting of the Compact Board, the Executive Director of the
Global Compact Office pointed out that participants face important hurdles in developing
COP, e.g., "the fact that many companies in non-English speaking regions are unsure of
what the COP policy asks." COMPACT BOARD MEETING REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. One
simple response to such hurdles is that only those corporations should decide to participate
which understand, or are ready to make sincere efforts for such an understanding, what the
Compact entails. In addition, a useful suggestion was, in fact, advanced at the Board's
meeting itself. Namely, that "non-reporters" could be divided into those who failed to
report for no good reason (insincere ones) and those who have not reported because of
genuine difficulties (sincere ones). See id. at 10.
165. With the exception of Australia, it is ensured that at least two countries are chosen
from each of the continents. Hong Kong and Singapore are chosen primarily because they
are considered corporate hubs.
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participants, the data regarding participants from fourteen countries is
collected and analyzed again after four months, on July 18, 2006.
Third, an attempt is made to measure the response to the Global
Compact shown by the world's top corporations, that is, those which are
represented in Fortune Global 500 and Financial Times Global 500.

1.

Ever-Increasing Participants, but Still a Drop in the Ocean!

Corporations are steadily participating in the Global Compact. The
number of total participants has increased over the years: 38 in July
2000; 263 in December 2001; 721 in December 2002; 1, 180 in
December 2003; 2,136 in December 2004; and 2,735 in December
2005. 166 As of March 18, 2006, there were 2,902 participants, out of
which a great majority were corporations. Both the number of
participants and the rate at which the participations are increasing look
impressive. However, if one looks at the total number of multinational
parent corporations and their foreign subsidiaries, this rosy impression
changes. 167 According to the 2004 figures released by the U.N.CTAD,
there are 63,834 multinational parent corporations with 866, 119 foreign
affiliates. 168 From this data, one could imagine the number of total
corporations in the world. For example, it is estimated that the number
of active U.S. corporations alone is nearing 5 million. 169 So, in
comparison to the potential participants in the world, the number of
Compact participants is like a drop in the ocean. In fact, at this stage
the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), a European corporate
environmental responsibility 1mtiattve, has more organizations
registered with it than the total number of Global Compact
participants. 170
Before moving on the distribution of participants in terms of sector
or region, another note of caution about the number of total Compact

166. United Nations Global Compact, Advancing Corporate Citizenship in the World

Economy,

available

at

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/gc_overview.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2006).
167. "What about the other 59,000 companies that are not covered by the Global
Compact?" Weissbrodt, supra note 140, at 70.
168. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND
GLOBALISATION: FACTS AND FIGURES, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.16 (2004).
169. BizStats.com,
Total
Number
of
U .S.
Corporations,
http://www.bizstats.com/numbercorps.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
170. On Sept. 15, 2006, there were 3,389 EMAS registered organizations. See
EUROPA,
Who
Can
Participate
in
EMAS,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/about/participate/sites_en.htm (last visited Oct. 31,
2006).
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participants is in place. In many cases, the figure as to the number of
participants includes several corporate participants from the same
group. Interestingly, though the direct participation of the subsidiaries
of a corporate group is not prohibited, this is not something that the
Global Compact requires. Once the parent corporation agrees to
participate, it is assumed that all subsidiaries participate automatically.
So, the number of real participants may be even fewer. In an answer to
the question, "can company subsidiaries join the Global Compact?," the
website of the Compact offers the following response:
The Global Compact applies the leadership principle. If the CEO of a
company's global parent (holding, group, etc.) embraces the Global
Compact by sending a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, the Global
Compact will post only the name of the parent company on the global
list assuming that all subsidiaries participate as well. Subsidiaries
that wish to directly send a letter to the Secretary-General, to underline
their commitment, will be listed as participants, and are invited to
become active in the Global Compact country network of their host
country. 171

Apart from the manifest justification that the Compact applies "the
leadership principle," the policy of not requiring subsidiaries to sign
separate support letters is perhaps driven more by pragmatism. In view
of a large number of subsidiaries around the world, the task of the
Compact office may become unmanageable even if a small percentage
of subsidiaries start to participate in their own right. However, in
achieving this practical result, the Compact sacrifices an important
principle of corporate law which is quite close to the heart of
corporations.
It is the well established principle of "separate
personality," 172 which could be bypassed by the courts only in certain
exceptional situations. 173
This policy of the Global Compact,
unconsciously, endorses the "enterprise principle" under which all the
constituent corporations of a group are treated as one legal person
provided they are part of an integral business group. 174 This unintended
171. United Nations Global Compact, Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/faq.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2006)
(emphasis added).
172. See L.C.B. GOWER, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 97-102 (4th
ed. 1979); PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW:
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 1-20 (1993); Cindy A Schipani,
Infiltration of Enterprise Theory into Environmental Jurisprudence, 22 J. CORP. L. 599,
601-03 (1997).
173. GOWER, supra note! 73, at 112-38; ROMAN TOMASIC ET. AL., CORPORATIONS LAW
IN AUSTRALIA 2-50 (2d ed. 2002).
174. BLUMBERG, THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY, supra note 174, at
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result should come as a bonus for those who argue for the liability of the
parent corporation for the misconduct of its subsidiaries. 175
In terms of distribution, the Compact participants are well spread
over a range of sectors. 176 However, as Chart 1 shows, the regional
distribution of participants is highly uneven. Almost 49% of the total
participants are based in Europe · alone, the Americas coming distant
second with 29% participants. 177 Out of Americas' 29% share of the
total Compact participants, the percentage of North American
participants is quite dismal, ranging between 5% to 8%. 178 Whereas
Asia is the home of about 17% of the Compact participants, the share of
Africa (3.45%), the Middle East (1.79%) and Australasia (0.72%) is
negligible. This regional imbalance in the distribution of participants
again negates the globalness of the Global Compact. There should be
no consolation in the fact that "this reflects a general trend among
similar global corporate citizenship initiatives," 179 because other
initiatives do not so vigorously claim a global pedestal.

viii-ix; Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations
under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493,
493-94 (2002) [hereinafter Blumberg, Conceptual and Procedural Problems].
175. For example, Blumberg, Conceptual and Procedural Problems, supra note 175, at
528-29; Deva, Code of Conduct Bill 2000, supra note 125, at 99-109. See also David
Aronofsky, Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends, Developments and the Need
for Widespread Adoption of Enterprise Analysis, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 31 ( 1985).
176. Advancing Corporate Citizenship in the World Economy, supra note 166, at 9.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1O; McKinsey & Co., supra note 138, at 10-11.
179. Mc Kinsey & Co., supra note 138, at 11.
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Chart 1
Regional Disribution of Participants of the Global Compact

Asia, 16.61%

Europe, 48.35%

Total Number of Participants: 2902 (as on 18 IVarch 2006)

2.

Already "Non-communicating"?

A Compact website lists a participant as "non-communicating" if it
"failed to develop a Communication on Progress by the relevant
deadline or has not yet provided a link to/description of their
Communication on Progress." 180 Apparently, this is an absolute
minimum that one could expect from a serious participant.
Surprisingly, many Compact participants have failed to fulfill even this
bare minimum. Chart 2 lists the data regarding fourteen countries from
six continents. With the exception of Argentina and Singapore, there
are non-communicating participants, to a varying degree, in eleven
other surveyed countries. The case of Hong Kong - which is not a
country but only an autonomous region 181 - deserves a brief
explanation. Although it is widely considered a center of international
commerce and finance, where several MNCs have established their
regional offices, not even a single Hong Kong corporation has signed to
the Compact. Therefore, Hong Kong's zero percentage of non-

180. Non-Communicating Participants,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/CommunicatingProgress/non_communicating.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2006).
181. See YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION
OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LA w (2d ed. 1999) ( 1997); Heng Loong Cheng,
Hong Kong SAR: Autonomy Within Integration?, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181
(1999-2000); Guiguo Wang & Priscilla M.F. Leung, One Country, Two Systems: Theory
into Practice, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 279 (1998).
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communicating participants is irrelevant and premature at this stage.
But one could still infer from the above analysis that a sizeable number
of the Compact participants do not take the Global Compact and its
principles seriously.
Chart 2
.

A comparlalon between the number of Global Compact partlclcpants and
participants In fourteen countries

t~e "non -communnlcatlng" ----~,

Countrl. .

[•Total number of participants Eil Number of "non-communicating" participants
..
-

J

* Hong Kong is taken here as a country merely to keep conformity with the data
available at the Global Compact website.
The trend of non-communication participants is, however, not
limited to the fourteen surveyed countries. In fact, the trend of nonseriousness reflected through non-communication is quite widespread.
Out of the total number of Compact participants, almost 25%
participants are listed as non-communicating.
In order to find out if the level of non-communicating participants
in fourteen surveyed countries shows any pattern, the global average of
non-communicating participants (24.88%) could be compared to the
percentage in these countries. As one may notice from Chart 3, the
percentage of non-communicating participants varies greatly from
lowest being 0% in case of Argentina and Singapore to almost 70% in
case of Philippines. Do we see any significant difference in data from
developing and developed countries, especially because Professor
Ruggie pointed out the participation of a large number of developing
country companies as one of "biggest surprises in the Global
Compact?" 182 As compared to developed countries, are corporations

182. Ruggie, supra note 35 , at 306. A May 2004 report also concludes: "The Compact
has established a relatively strong presence in developing countries with more than half of
the Compact's formal participants headquartered outside the OECD." McKinsey & Co.,
supra note 138, at 11.
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from developing countries more or less serious when it comes to the
implementation of the Compact principles?
Although the sample size of the survey is admittedly small, it
indicates no clear trend either in developing or developed countries. 183
In comparison to the global average (24.88%), the percentage of noncommunicating participants is significantly higher in some developing
countries like Philippines (69.80%) and India (45.70%), but very low in
Argentina (0.00%), and Mexico (1.96%). The percentage of noncommunicating companies in China (22.28%), South Africa (25.00%)
and Brazil (29.14%) is more or less around the global average. On the
other hand, developed countries like Singapore (0.00%), Japan (9.09%)
and Germany (10.77%) stand out for having a very low level of noncommunicating participants in comparison to other developed countries
such as the U.S. (20.97%), Australia (25.00%), and France (27.05%),
which are marginally at par with the global average. Thus, there is a
great divergence in the level of seriousness shown by the Compact
participants, both from the developing and developed world. At the
same time, it is possible to suggest, as a preliminary and tentative
finding, that the percentage of non-communicating participants in
developed countries is unlikely to be as high as found in two developing
countries: Philippines and India.
It may also be important to note that the percentage of noncommunicating U.S. corporations is lower than the global average of
non-communicating companies. This might come as a surprise because
the U.S. corporations companies have been at the forefront of backlash,
as well as court actions, for human rights abuses. 184 Althou~h the U.S.
companies have been slow to embrace the Global Compact 1 5 (because
of a fear of being drawn to courts for signing but not complying with
the Compact principles), 186 it seems that those that take a plunge

183. See how this percentage changed after four months. See infra note 187.
184. Most of these cases have been filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 and the
Torture Victim Protection Act 1991.
See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 16-19 (Hart 2004 ); Jordan Paust, Human
Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 802-09,
820-25
(2002).
A
list
of
such
cases
is
also
available
at
http://www.law.monash.edu.au/castancentre/projects/mchr/trans-hr-litigation.html
(last
visited Nov. 5, 2006).
185. As of March 18, 2006, only 124 U.S. corporations had signed to the Compact.
186. "[T]he U.S. is a very litigious society. Therefore, the challenge of getting a CEO
to sign to principles is much greater than in any other culture." An Interview with Kell,
supra note 52. See also McKinsey & Co., supra note 138, at 11. With reference to the
Unocal case and Sosa case, Kielsgard shows how voluntary corporate human rights pledges
could be used to impeach their conduct during legal proceedings. Mark D. Kielsgard,
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generally take some steps to implement the Compact principles and
avoid being listed as non-communicating.
Given that almost one-quarter of the Compact participants are noncommunicating, it is safe to conclude that many corporations have
become party to the Global Compact either without realizing what it
entails, or are consciously embracing the Compact as a public relations
exercise. But why is there a great disparity in the average of noncommunicating participating companies in different countries, both
developing and developed? To understand reasons behind this disparity,
a further in-depth investigation is required. Such investigation, among
others, should focus on the general corporate culture in a given country
and the level of awareness among stakeholders as to what corporations
do or do not do.
In order to verify if there is a significant fluctuation in the
percentage of non-communicating participants, the data from fourteen
surveyed countries is analyzed again after four months, that is, on July
18, 2006. In these four months, the number of the Global Compact
participants increased in thirteen countries, but still there was no
participant from Hong Kong. Whereas the rise in the percentage of total
Compact participants was quite marginal in Argentina (1.97%), and
Philippines (2.87% ), it was phenomenal in case of Mexico (91.17% ),
and Singapore (300.00%). Except Singapore (which maintained a clean
record of 0% non-communicating participants), the percentage of noncommunicating participants in other twelve countries either went up or
down in this period of four months. 187 Whereas the percentage of noncommunicating participants went up in Argentina, Brazil, China,
France, South Africa and the U.S., it went down in case of Australia,
Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, and Philippines. Again, no clear trend
in the fluctuation of the percentage of non-communicating participants
is noticeable. Nevertheless, it is entirely probable that a more detailed
research with a larger sample size and longer time span might indicate a
pattern.
Unocal and the Demise of Corporate Neutrality, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 185, 203-12 (2005).
To overcome this corporate fear, a "litigation-proof' letter has been drafted by the American
Bar Association and vetted by 20,000 business lawyers. An Interview with Kell, supra note
52.
187. Barring Singapore (which experienced no change) and Hong Kong (in which case
the data is not relevant as it has no participant to date), the exact variation in the percentage
of non-communicating participants in other twelve surveyed countries was as follows:
Argentina (0.00% to 6.76%), Australia (25 .00% to 15.38%), Brazil (29.14% to 35 .76%),
China (22.58% to 44.29%), France (27.05% to 34.58%), Germany (10.77% to 7.14%), India
(45.69% to 42.74%), Japan (9.09% to 6.38%), Mexico (1.96% to 1.54%), Philippines
(69.78% to 67.13%), South Africa (25.00% to 28.57%), and the U.S . (20.97% to 22.37%).
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Chart 3
Percentage of "non-cornnmicatlng" participants in fourteen countries vis-a-vis the global average
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3.

Where Do the World's Top Corporations Stand?

Finally, it may be relevant to find out how the world's largest
corporations have responded to the challenge of embracing the Global
Compact. A list of the world's top corporations is compiled by several
financial magazines or newspapers, such as Fortune, Forbes and the
Financial Times. Based on the ranking of the Financial Times Global
500, 188 the Compact Office takes pride in stating that 106 of the world's
largest 500 companies have signed to the Global Compact. 189 The "CG
Global 106," as the Compact's website calls them, come from twentyfive countries, directly employ around ten million people, and have a
market value of about USD$3.5 trillion. 190 The support of Global 106
(21.20% of the total Financial Times Global 500) to the Compact is
undoubtedly an encouraging sign, also because of these companies, only
one (Johnson Controls Inc.) has been listed as a non-communicating
company.
In addition to the Financial Times Global 500, it is also examined
how Fortune Global 500 191 has shown an interest to participate in the

188. FT.com,
Global
500,
http://media.ft.com/cms/adb61f66-f7bf-l lda-94810000779e2340,dwp_uuid=5al6620a-fl 78-l lda-940b-0000779e2340.pdf (last visited Nov.
17, 2006).
189. Global Compact, Economic and Social Impact of the GC Global 106, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/CommunicatingProgress/global_ 105_ ecosoc_impact.html
(last visited Aug. 13, 2006). However, on August 13, 2006 a search of participants on the
Global Compact's website turned up a list ofonly 103 companies.
190. Id. It is interesting to note that though 219 U.S. corporations have been listed in
the FT 500, only 9 have signed to the Compact. Id.
191. Fortune.com,
The
2005
Global
500,
http://www.jcgi.pathfinder.com/fortune/global500 (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
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U.N.'s "public-private" partnership for corporate citizenship. Since the
Compact applies the leadership principle, 192 a Fortune Global 500 is
considered a participant to the Global Compact only if the parent
corporation is a participant. In some cases, although the parent has not
signed to the Global Compact, one or more of its subsidiaries has
become a participant in its own right. For example, although Ford
Motor is missing from the list of Compact participants, Ford Argentina
and Ford Malaysia are parties to the Compact. Similarly, Fiat France
and Fiat Argentina have signed, but not Fiat, the parent corporation.
Also, GlaxoSmithKline Romania and GlaxoSmithKline Bulgaria are
participants of the Global Compact, but not their UK parent.
Of these 500 corporations, 131 (about 26% of the total number)
were participants of the Global Compact on March 18, 2006. Some of
the prominent corporations that have embraced the Compact are: BP,
Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Total, Allianz, Volkswagen, Siemens,
Hewlett-Packard, Nissan Motors, Unilever, BMW, Toshiba, NEC,
Nokia, Bayer, Indian Oil, Volvo, L'Oreal, Pfizer, Novartis, Coca-Cola,
Cisco Systems, BHP Billiton, Lufthansa Group, Electrolux, Gap, Xerox,
Hindustan Petroleum, Henkel, and Westpac Banking.
On the other hand, around 74% of the top 500 global corporations
(369 corporations) have not yet become signatory to the Global
Compact. Many of the world's well-known corporations are part of this
missing list of Compact participants, e.g., Wal-Mart, Exxon Mobil,
General Motors, Toyota Motor, Ford Motor, General Electric, Chevron
Texaco, Citigroup, ING Group, Hitachi, Honda Motor, Sinopec,
Samsung Electronics, Vodafone, Sony, Boeing, Procter & Gamble,
Target, Dell, Johnson & Johnson, Hyundai Motor, Dow Chemicals,
Microsoft, LG Electronics, Walt Disney, Canon, Mitsubishi, Motorola,
PepsiCo, DuPont, Spirit, FedEx, China Life Insurance, British
American Tobacco, Sharp, China Mobile Communications, Coles Myer,
Hilton Group, Halliburton, Woolworths, National Australia Bank,
McDonald's, Bank of China, Telstra, Chinese Petroleum, Reliance
Industries, AMP, British Airways, Kingfisher, Whirlpool, and Chubb.
The objective of this survey was not to suggest that all the
Compact participants ipso facto become good corporate citizens, or that
embracing the Global Compact is the litmus test for responsible
corporate conduct. Several Compact participants such as Coca-Cola,
BHP, Shell, L'Oreal, and Cisco have been the subject matter of public
criticism or even legal actions for their policies/actions that violate

192. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 171.
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human rights, labor standards, or pollute the environment. Conversely,
even without participating in the Compact, corporations could join other
initiatives and fulfill their social responsibilities in an effective manner.
Rather, the objective was to measure the extent to which the world's
largest corporations were buying the idea of the Global Compact.
On the basis of above findings, it can be reasonably concluded that
the world's leading corporations have found joining the Compact an
attractive proposition. As most of these corporations have already
adopted some kind of code of conduct, 193 and may have assigned the
responsibility of looking after CSR issues to someone within the
organization, joining the Compact is not likely to put much additional
burden on them. 194 Conversely, signing to the Compact provides direct
access to the U .N .. 195 Therefore, it is expected that more Global 500
corporations will become Compact participants in coming years. 196 The
extent to which these corporations take and would continue to take the
Compact commitments seriously is, however, an altogether separate
issue.
III. MAJOR DEFICIENCIES OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT

In the last seven years, the Global Compact has made significant
progress towards promoting awareness about the responsibilities that
corporations do or should have towards society. 197 More than anything
else, it has brought back the CSR issue to the center stage of the U.N. 198
193. "One would be hard-pressed to find any major corporation today that did not make
some claim to abiding by a code of conduct that comprised, at least in part, adherence to
human rights standards. Indeed, more often than not, such adherence to codes is trumpeted
by major corporations." David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence
of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporation at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
931, 953 (2004).
194. Nolan writes that in its current form the Compact "is not a vehicle to push
companies beyond their comfort zone .... "Nolan, supra note 10, at 447.
195. Kofi Annan implicitly conceded this: "Through the Global Compact Office, many
United Nations organizations have found a new entry point for engaging businesses and
improving their own ability to work with the private sector." Report of the Secretary
General, supra note 34, at 45.
196. Microsoft, for example, has recently decided to participate in the Global Compact.
"Microsoft
Announces
Participation
in
GC,"
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/N ewsAndEvents/news_archives/2006_ l l _22 .html
(last
visited Dec. 4, 2006).
197. "Give the Compact credit for making human rights, the environment, the rule of
law and civic responsibility an essential part of doing business in an increasingly globalized
economy .... " King, supra note 18, at 485.
198. Although the U.N. in 1974 had constituted a Commission on Transnational
Corporations to draft an agreeable code of conduct for TNCs, the attempt failed to
materialize due to various reasons and the Commission was dismantled in 1993. PETER
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and has made corporations conscious about their social responsibilities.
Nonetheless, the Global Compact has received (and continues to
receive) mixed reactions from corporations, labor organizations, NGOs
and member countries, 199 and its credibility as well as success are
uncertain at this stage. 200 In addition to the already highlighted
generally vague nature of the Compact principles and the nonresponsiveness or non-seriousness of corporations towards the Global
Compact, below is a brief review of some other major deficiencies. 201

A.

Directional Uncertainty

The Compact still faces a directional crisis. It is still not clear or
certain what it wants to achieve and what it leaves to be achieved by
other regulatory initiatives. 202 Despite express assertions that the
Compact is neither a regulatory framework (as a substitute for
government regulation or otherwise) nor "positioned to compete with
other voluntary initiatives,"203 it in effect does both. The Compact not
only tries to regulate (though in the disguise of voluntary selfregulation), but also seems to dwarf other similar voluntary

MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 593-96 (Blackwell Publishers
Inc., 1995). Murphy, supra note 141, at 403-05; Nolan, supra note 10, at 454-55. Since
1993 the issues related with TNCs are dealt with by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (U.N.CTAD).
199. Taylor, supra note 61, at 980-82; King, supra note 18, at 481; Meaghan
Shaughnessy, The United Nations Global Compact and the Continuing Debate about the
Effectiveness of Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct, 2000 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
PoL'Y 159, 161, 171 (2000); Blackett, supra note 36, at 442. See also COMPACT PROGRESS
REPORT, supra note 36, at 10, 25-30.
200. See William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the U.N. Global
Compact, and the Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501, 503-04 (2001). See also
Letters from Lawyers Committee for Human Rights to the Global Compact Office,
http://lchr.org/workers_rights/wr_other/LCHR_to_U.N._Oct_Ol.pdf (Oct. 25, 2001);
http://www.lchr.org/workers_rights/wr_other/LCHR_to_U.N._Nov_Ol.pdf (Nov. 1, 2001);
http://www.lchr.org/workers_rights/wr_other/joint_ltr_U.N._040703.pdf (Apr. 7, 2003) (last
visited Sept. 19, 2006).
201. "In three crucial areas it appears that the Global Compact model suffers
fundamental flaws ... the lack of clarity in the content and scope of the Compact's
principles; its limited notions of accountability and transparency; and the overemphasis on
the value of the voluntary approach to improving corporate behaviour .... " Nolan, supra
note 10, at 459. King also sums up some of the "valid" concerns raised against the Compact.
King, supra note 18, at 482.
202. Nolan observes that the Compact "seems clearer now on what it is and what it is
not than when it was first established .... " Nolan, supra note 10, at 453 (emphasis added).
203. Kell, supra note 41, at 41. See also King, supra note 18, at 483. Blackett also
argues: "[T]he Global Compact wisely does not try to create an all-encompassing "code;"
rather, it seeks only to coexist with existing and future initiatives." Blackett, supra note 36,
at 444 (emphasis added).
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initiatives. 204 In fact, one of the official documents of the Compact
expressly boasts of its comparative advantage vis-a-vis other CSR
initiatives: "The Global Compact's comparative advantage rests in the
universality of its ten principles, the international legitimacy and
convening power of the United Nations, and the Compact's potential to
be a truly global platform with appeal not only in industrialized
countries, but also in the developing world. " 205
Recently, Secretary General Kofi Annan also emphasized this
advantage: "the Global Compact has been endorsed by all U.N. member
states, giving the initiative unprecedented access, including in countries
where others have difficulty gaining access alone."206
B.

Net Reports/COP

The Global Compact originally required that participating
companies submit an annual "net report" to show their commitment
towards the Compact principles. 207 As mentioned before, since January
2003, this has been replaced with the COP. 208 A failure to provide the
COP may result in that corporation being listed on the Compact's
website as a "non-communicating" participant. Though the requirement
is not very onerous, about 25% of the total participants (mostly
corporations) have defaulted on this requirement in such a short life
span of the Compact.
On a separate level, even if this attitude of participants does change
in the future and more corporations submit COPs, the real efficacy of
this strategy is doubtful. Of course, it is advisable to share good
corporate practices and learn from each other's experiences, because
arguably good practices might help to "drive out" bad practices. 209 But
in the absence of any proper and independent monitoring of the conduct
of companies, the whole exercise may often prove to be a mere ritual or
204. While assessing the impact of the Compact, McKinsey & Co. in its report of May
2004 observed: "With more than 1, 100 companies formally committed to the Global
Compact, the Global Compact is by far the world's largest voluntary corporate citizenship
network, dwarfing other similar, voluntary initiatives, such as the Global Reporting
Initiative (387 participants) and SA8000 (353 participants)." McKinsey & Co., supra note
138, at 10.
205. Advancing Corporate Citizenship, supra note 22, at 1.
206. Compact Board Meeting Report, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasis added).
207. Participation in the Global Compact requires that once a year the concerned
company submit to the Compact's website "concrete example[s]" of how it has internalised
one or more Compact principles. See COMPACT PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 36, at 6, 9,
19.
208. Communication on Progress, supra note 78.
209. Ruggie, supra note 35, at 303.
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a public relations gimmick. 210 Sethi argues that "the Global Compact at
best will be a good old boys club and at worst a support group in which
like-minded corporations will share their experiences and encourage
each other to do better next time." 211 Moreover, companies might also
pick up bad practices through learning forums - how to spread the
image of being a good corporate citizen while doing little to earn this
label.

C.

Lack of Verification and Independent Monitoring

It is a declared policy of the Global Compact that it does not
provide for any recourse in case that world business leaders ignore this
"moral compass," 212 that is, fail to embrace its principles. It is openly
admitted that "the Global Compact is not a code of conduct; monitoring

and verification of corporate practices do not fall within the mandate or
the institutional capability of the United Nations." 213 Dialogue with
business is a central tool of the Global Compact in ensuring respect for
its principles, but it is doubtful if the means employed could achieve the
ends. With reference to the promotion of human rights, Alston argues:
[I]t must suffice to say that the U.N. and the various specialized
agencies already have endless dialogues designed to promote policy
coordination and it is difficult to see how the addition of one new one,
albeit termed a Global Compact, would be more successful in relation
to human ri~hts when other dialogues have yet to be especially
productive. 21

It is also likely that corporate executives will continue to resist any

210. Carolin Hillemanns, U.N. Norms of the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights, 4 GERMAN
LA w
JOURNAL
1065,
1069
(2003),
available
at
www.germanlawjoumal.com/pdfNol04No 1O/PDF
_ Vol_04_No_l 0_10651080_European_Hillemanss.pdf.
211. Murphy, supra note 141, at 413 (quoting S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL
STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR CREATING CODES OF CONDUCT IN MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 120 (John Wiley & Sons, 2003)).
212. "At its core, the Compact is nothing more than a moral compass." Kell, supra note
41, at 47.
213. Press Release, United Nations, Kofi Annan Enlist Corporations, Civil Society to
Tackle Globalization Challenges, Note No. 91 (July 25, 2000), available at
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2000/note91.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
"The major criticism, ... [of the Compact] has been for what it is not: a regulatory
arrangement, specifically a legally binding code of conduct with explicit performance
criteria and independent monitoring of company compliance." Ruggie, supra note 35, at
302.
214. Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade
Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 837 (2002).
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attempts directed at external monitoring or mandatory enforcement of
the Compact principles, 215 despite the fact that external independent
monitoring as well as a robust and transparent system for evaluating
corporations' conduct are desirable. 216 Leisinger identifies another
hurdle in institutionalizing independent verification: "who can be
considered an independent juror?"217 In terms of independence,
expertise and legitimacy of potential verifiers, corporations, and other
stakeholders might have divergent views. To overcome this, it is
suggested that "several actors with different competencies and
experience" could collaborate to verif}' the extent to which human rights
responsibilities have been observed. 21

D.

Misuse of the Compact as a Marketing Tool

It may be technically correct to argue that the Global Compact
does not "endorse companies that participate in this initiative,"219 but it
is equally true that the Compact would also not stop participating
companies from projecting themselves as responsible corporate citizens
on account of being Compact parties. In fact, there is an apprehension
that some corporations might use the Compact as a "marketing tool"220
to "bluewash" their reputation or image, 22 or to gain undue sympathy
from consumers and prospective shareholders or employees. 222 For

215. Ruggie argues that "any U .N. attempt to impose a code of conduct not only would
be opposed by the business community, but also would drive progressive business leaders,
who are willing to engage with the Compact, into a more uniform anti-code coalition."
Ruggie, supra note 35, at 303.
216. Shaughnessy, supra note 198, at 161; Letter from Michael Posner, Executive Dir.,
Human Rights First, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen. (Jun. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/workers_rights/pdf/annan_global_compact_060404.pdf
(last visited Nov. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Letter from Human Rights First].
217. Leisinger, supra note 142, at 12.
218. Id.
219. King, supra note 18, at 482.
220. Letter from Human Rights First, supra note 216, at 1.
221. Taylor, supra note 61, at 980; Troy Rule, Using Norms to Change International
Law: U.N. Human Rights Laws Sneaking in Through the Back Door?, 5 CHI. J. INT'L. L.
326, 328 (2004); Blackett, supra note 36, at 442. Blackett argues: "Despite terms in the
guidelines that suggest that corporations that are complicit in human rights abuses will not
be eligible for partnership, it is not apparent that any triage has been undertaken." Id. at
445.
222. This concern is raised very eloquently in a recent letter written by Human Rights
First to the U.N. Secretary General:
If the Global Compact is intended simply as an open forum that includes all
companies, regardless of their record, then you should make this clear. This would
then limit the opportunity for companies to use their participation in global Compact
meetings for public relations purposes. . . . Companies that are not taking their
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example, BHP - despite blatantly ignoring the mandate for "collective
bargaining" - continues to represent on its website as well as in its
various reports that BHP is committed to the Global Compact
principles. BHP, however, is not alone being accused of bluewashing
its image; it shares the dais with other well known MNCs such as
Bayer, Nike, Shell, Rio Tinto, and Nestle. 223
One major reason why corporations might easily get away with
misusing their association with the U.N. Global Compact is that the
Compact Office "neither regulates nor monitors a company's
submissions and initiatives". 224 In other words, there is no effective
mechanism to differentiate real, committed participants from namesake,
uncommitted participants. Even the current logo policy and integrity
measures do not adequately and squarely address this issue. 225

E.

Amorphous Role of States

Although the Compact is not a state-focal corporate citizenship
initiative, states are still one of its key stakeholders from which it
requires multi-facet support. 226 Blackett also suggests that it may be
necessary to bring to the "fore" the role of government in implementing
the Compact principles. 227 But the Compact Office to date has failed to
charter a proper role of states in ensuring that the Compact participants
respect their commitments. On the contrary, the Shanghai Declaration
indicates that corporations could use this U.N. organ to set demands for,

commitments seriously should not continue to benefit from their formal association
with the Global Compact.
Letter from Human Rights First, supra note 216, at 1-2. In fact, the Global Compact Office
also, in its letter dated June 22, 2004 to the Human Rights First, has acknowledged this
"concern about the need to protect the integrity of the Global Compact." Letter from John
Ruggie & George Kell, Special Advisor & Executive Head, Executive Office of the Sec'y
Gen., to Michael Posner, Executive Dir., Human Rights First (June 22, 2004), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/workers_rights/pdf/un_response_ruggie_kell_062204.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
223. See Bigge, supra note 62, at 12-13.
224. Kell, supra note 41, at 38.
225. See Global Compact Note on Integrity Measures, supra note 72; Policy on the Use
of the Global Compact Name and Logos, supra note 74.
226. ADVANCING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, supra note 22, at 4. "Governments provide
the essential legitimacy and universality to the principles of the Compact. Ultimately,
implementation of the principles takes place within the legislative and regulatory
frameworks developed by governments. .As legislatures, they create an enabling, legal
environment in which voluntary initiatives, such as the Global Compact, play a
complementary role . . . . At the national level, governments support Compact events and
the formation of Global Compact country networks." Id.
227. Blackett, supra note 36, at 444.
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and exert undue influence, over states. 228 Should this go too far and the
business starts dictating the business of the Global Compact Office and
international law generally, 229 even this novel partnership might face a
legitimacy crisis among states and other stakeholders.
CONCLUSION

This article has critically analyzed the evolution and progress made
by the Global Compact - U.N.'s "public-private" partnership for
responsible corporate citizenship.
Although General Assembly
Resolution 60/125 underlines "the intergovernmental nature of the
United Nations,"230 it is clear that the partnership seeks to take the U.N.
much beyond an inter-state institution. 231 The partnership, which
charters an altogether new and ambitious course for the U.N., is also a
testimony of the changing nature of international law, and the growing
influence of non-state actors in the international arena.
The Compact should be given credit where it is due. For several
reasons, the Global Compact is constantly able to attract participants
from all over the world. This has, at least, created awareness among
corporations to look beyond profit maximization. One cannot also deny
the fact that it contributed in fostering multi-stakeholder partnerships for
promoting social responsibilities of corporations. 232 More importantly,

228. The language of point 15 of the Shanghai Declaration is worth noting, especially
because the Declaration was signed about two weeks before the Sixth WTO Ministerial
Conference and there were grave concerns that not much progress may be made at the Hong
Kong meeting:
We recognize that the wider benefits of responsible business practices can only
materialize if Governments provide for and strengthen a multilateral trading system
that is open, fair and non-discriminatory, and if they further improve the
international financial regime by putting in place a healthy and orderly trading
financial environment conducive to growth and development. We are especially
concerned that protectionism and inward-orientation could deny developing
countries the ability to take full advantage of trading opportunities where they enjoy
a comparative advantage. We call upon Governments to show global responsibility
by bringing the Doha round of trade negotiations to a successful conclusion - only
then can business fully contribute to poverty reduction and harmonious
development. We also call upon Governments that have not yet done so to ratify or
accede to the United Nations Convention against Corruption as a matter of high
priority.
Shanghai Declaration, supra note 108, ~ 15 (emphasis added).
229. See generally, SHARON BEDER, SUITING THEMSELVES: How CORPORATIONS DRIVE
THE GLOBAL AGENDA (2006).
230. G.A. Res. 60/215, supra note 60, at 1 .
231 . See generally, Enhanced Corporation, supra note 8, at 10, 21; WITTE & REINICKE,
supra note 11, at vii, ix.
232. See Ruggie, supra note 35, at 307. However, being a multi-stakeholder forum has
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the Compact - though still a work in progress - has paved the way for
the U .N.' s engagement with key non-state actors to tackle pressing
challenges of the 21st century.
Nevertheless, as this article
demonstrates, the Global Compact still has several deficits, which
directly undermine its mandate of promoting responsible corporate
citizenship. To sum up, the Compact principles are very general and
vague. There is a major imbalance in the regional distribution of its
participants, a very high percentage of participants are noncommunicating implying non-seriousness and lack of commitment on
their part, and the Compact framework allows insincere corporate
citizens to mix with sincere ones and thus, take undue advantage of the
Compact's goodwill.
Therefore, instead of congratulating itself for being the world's
largest and most widely embraced corporate citizenship initiative, the
Compact Office should focus· on extending the reach of the initiative,
but at the same time also strive for quality control. In order to influence
how business is (or should be) conducted around the world, it is equally
vital that not-so-good-corporations also join the initiative, because the
Global Compact may not add much value if "corporations with the least
need to change are the ones who join" it. 233 It should, therefore, be a
matter of concern for the Compact Office that most corporations at best
found the Global Compact accelerating a policy change rather than
driving new initiatives 234 - implying thereby that even without
embracing the Compact these corporations would have done what they
are doing now.
Finally, the Compact Office has to devise means and strategies to
ensure that those corporations which join the initiative fulfill their social
responsibilities both in letter and spirit. For achievin~ this objective, it
need not become an international regulatory agency. 35 The Compact
could continue to remain a voluntary platform for dialogue-cum-action
and still make useful contributions,236 but it should ensure that only
its own hazards as "divergent and unmet expectations limit the impact on companies and
continue to threaten the Compact' long term credibility with participants." McKinsey & Co.,
supra note 138, at 2.
233. Murphy, supra note 141, at 413.
234. McKinsey & Co., supra note 138, at 3-5.
235. It is suggested, somewhat rightly, that the Compact Office has no "mandate,
competency, or resources to think seriously about monitoring." An Interview with Kell,
supra note 52, at 2.
236. Kielsgard, for example, explores several utilities of "corporate voluntarism."
Among others, he argues:
The issuance of corporate human rights policies and acquiescence to international
initiatives, like the Global Compact, pledges the corporations to adhere to certain
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those corporations join and remain on the platform which mean
business. It is in both private and public interests that only really
responsible corporate citizens are allowed to reap the benefit of keeping
company with the U .N.

standards of behaviour and puts them on the record vis-a-vis their responsibility for
human rights norms. If these corporations violate human rights, then the use of the
company policy to impeach them, either in a public relations forum or in a lawsuit,
can have a devastating impact.
Kielsgard, supra note 186, at 203. But see Bigge, supra note 62, at 7 (arguing that invoking
participation in the Global Compact to sue companies on the grounds of fraud or falseadvertising would be disastrous to the success of the Compact).
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